This paper studies identification for a broad class of empirical games in a general functional setting. Global identification results are known for some specific models, for instance in some standard auction models. We use functional formulations to obtain general criteria for local identification. These criteria can be applied to both parametric and nonparametric models, as well as models with asymmetry among players and affiliated private information. A benchmark model is developed where the structural parameters of interest are the distribution of private information and an additional dissociated parameter, such as a parameter of risk aversion. Criteria are derived for some standard auction models, games with exogenous variables, games with randomized strategies, such as mixed strategies, and games with strategic functions that cannot be derived analytically.
Introduction
The problem of identification in empirical games has received considerable attention but has only found answers in the context of certain models. Laffont and Vuong (1996) provide nonparametric identification results for some specific first-price sealed-bid auction models with risk-neutral bidders. Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong (2000) examine the particular case of the independent private value (IPV) paradigm and detail how to obtain identification. In some models nonparametric identification is not possible. In order to obtain identification, a parametric assumption may be necessary and sufficient. For instance, Donald and Paarsch (1996) present parametric identification results for an IPV auction model with risk aversion, but Campo et al. (2002) show that there is no nonparametric identification for this model. Campo et al. (2002) also show that semiparametric identification can be achieved through additional restrictions. This paper examines identification in a broad class of games. In order to obtain general identification criteria, we apply a local identification principle. This approach has a long history in econometrics, with notable contributions by, among others, Koopmans, Rubin and Leipnik (1950) , Wald (1950) , Fisher (1959 Fisher ( , 1961 Fisher ( , 1966 , Wegge (1965) and Rothenberg (1971) . In a substantial contribution, Fisher (1966) provides a unified treatment of the theory of identification for simultaneous equation models, and successfully develops Generalized Rank and Order Conditions for local identification. Rothenberg (1971) builds on this work by developing criteria for local identification for more general parametric models. More recently, Chesher (2003) uses quantile functions to provide local identification conditions in nonseparable models. In the literature, the desirability of global identification is clearly understood, but at the same time, the difficulty of obtaining these results is often emphasized.
A promising direction that has rarely been explored is to find a general framework to 1 They also provide an optimal estimation procedure. study identification for any structural model of games. This paper develops such a framework and obtains criteria applicable to a wide range of models, by following the local identification approach. We allow for nonparametric models by using a general functional setting.
In general, we consider J games, each game indexed by j, j = 1, ..., J. In each game j there are L j players, each player indexed by l, l = 1, ..., L j . We consider games as independent.
Thus, for ease of notation, we define our setting for one game with I players, with each player indexed by i.
2 For each player i, we have an observable x i , as the result of a transformation ϕ i of: (1) an unobservable ξ i , which represents private information and has a joint distribution F θ for all possible values of private information, or (2) an additional structural parameter λ i .(e.g., a parameter of risk aversion). So we have
where θ fully characterizes F θ , and λ = (λ 1 , ..., λ I ).
We can notice that, statistically, a game model is characterized in the following way:
the observable actions depend on unobservable variables (private information) and their distribution. This corresponds to the strategic aspect of the game, and causes a specific identification issue. Indeed, even if we consider that the strategic function ϕ is bijective and that θ would be identified if we could observe the ξ i 's, we may not be able to identify θ from the observable actions. We can illustrate this with two simple examples. First, let us assume that the private information ξ i follows a parametric Normal distribution, ξ i ∼ N (µ, σ 2 ), and the observable actions are function of ξ i taken in the following way:
and µ is not identified from the observations x i 's. Second, we can think about a nonparametric model, with the private information following a nonparametric distribution F , ξ i ∼ F , which would be identified if we would observe the ξ i 's, and x i = F ( ξ i ), with F bijective. In this case, we have x i ∼ U [0, 1] and F is not identified from the observations.
In Florens, Protopopescu and Richard (2001) , two criteria are found to identify F θ , assuming symmetric risk neutral players, in both the parametric and nonparametric case.
This was the first attempt to give a general identification condition that can be applied to any kind of game of incomplete information.
Our paper improves on previous work in several respects. First, we provide an identification condition for any parameters of the transformation ϕ i (e.g., a parameter of risk aversion) and not only the parameters of the distribution function. This condition is valid in the parametric case as well as in the nonparametric case. Second, we allow for asymmetry among bidders. Third, we study different extensions and difficulties one can face in practice. We treat the case of partial observability of the information used by the players (exogenous variables). In this case we partially observe the information players use to decide their strategy: the vector of information ξ = (η, z),is composed of the strictly private component η and an observable component z (e.g., the total number of players). The case of randomized strategies, such as mixed strategies, is also considered. Instead of assuming that action x is the result of a transformation ϕ, we assume that x follows a distribution H,
x ∼ H. Actually, x = ϕ (.) corresponds to the special case x ∼ δ ϕ , with δ ϕ the Dirac measure which puts all the weight on x = ϕ (.). We may have no analytical solutions for the first order conditions in the game model considered. Often, game theoretical models are complex and one cannot find a general analytical form for the strategic function ϕ. There are then non-closed form solutions for the first order conditions. We propose some solutions to adapt our local identification criteria to this problem. In most of the following sections, we will use the well-known First-Price Value auction model to illustrate the use of our identification approach.
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We concentrate on identification and not estimation. However, these issues are strongly related. Indeed, we will see in Section 2 that the model presented above generates a nonlinear 3 More examples are available on Erwann Sbai web site: http://www.homes.eco.auckland.ac.nz/esba001/ inverse problem. This type of problem is usually considered locally by the analysis of a linear operator tangent to the original one at the true value. The (local) ill-posedness properties are analysed through this linear operator. In particular, the spectrum of this operator declines at a slope that determines the speed of convergence of the estimator. In this work the identification is considered as a one to one property of this operator, which is a first step in the analysis of ill-posedness.
After presenting the general framework in the next section, we derive in section 3 a general theorem which states our first identification condition. Section 4 extends the general theorem to the case of exogenous variables, when there is partial observability of players'
information. In Section 5 we generalise our identification procedure to the case of randomized strategies, such as mixed strategies. Section 6 corresponds to the case of non-closed form solutions for the first order conditions of the game model considered. We conclude in Section 7.
General Framework and Specifications
We consider a game with I players. Player i draws private information
completely determined by θ ∈ Θ which is a (possibly functional) parameter. This situation covers the case where some elements of θ are specific to the distribution of ξ i . We denote f θ the associated joint density where this density is assumed to exist. Within each game, the ξ i 's are not necessarily independently and identically distributed (hereafter i.i.d.). We may for example consider some Common Value auction models. Nevertheless, we assume as usual that from one game to another the ξ i 's are i.i.d.. As we concentrate our attention on the identification issue, we consider a single observation model only. The distribution F θ (or the value θ) is common knowledge to all players of the games, but θ is unknown to the econometrician.
The unobservable ξ i are then transformed into observable actions x i ∈ R p , by means of a transformation ϕ i , say θ, λ) . In our framework, we assume that ϕ i exists. We consider λ ∈ Λ as a (possibly functional) parameter of the strategy function.
Here also this presentation covers the case where some elements of λ are specific to the ϕ i function. To simplify notation, we could also use the vector of the parameters of interest γ, where γ = (θ, λ) .
Assumption 1
The parameters θ and λ are variation free, i.e. the domain of γ = (θ, λ)
is Θ × Λ. For the (possibly functional) parameter γ we have: γ ∈ Γ ⊂ Γ 0 a normed vector space associated with the norm γ . We denote γ 0 = (θ 0 , λ 0 ) as the true unknown values.
This assumption eliminates common elements between θ and λ. In particular this implies that derivatives of functions of θ with respect to (hereafter w.r.t.) λ are zero (and conversely).
Assumption 2 For all i = 1, .., I we denote equivalently ϕ i ≡ ϕ i,θ,λ ≡ ϕ i,γ where
Note that the range of ϕ i usually depends on γ. We assume that ϕ i is a one to one and strictly increasing function, i.e.
We can denote ϕ as the vector of ϕ i 's, ϕ = (ϕ 1 , ..., ϕ I ). Also, we define the inverse function ϕ −1 . If we take a vector u, decomposed into I components of dimension p, we can write
The structural model may be summarized by
Particularly interesting cases are symmetric games defined by the following assumption:
Assumption 3 We will refer to symmetric game models if two conditions hold. First, the
where ϕ γ : Ξ → R 
Equivalently the relation between the structural form parameter γ and reduced form parameter G takes the implicit form:
The function G is identified (and may be estimated) by the data generating process and the goal of the structural analysis of the model is to determine the γ parameters from this equation. This paper is devoted to identification, i.e. the uniqueness of the solution in γ given G. Generally, the resolution of (3) , given an estimation of G, is actually a specific case of (nonlinear) inverse problem (see e.g. Carrasco et al. (2007) ). The present paper is not concerned with estimation, but we may remark that in most of the cases this inverse problem is mildly ill-posed (see Florens, Protopopescu and Richard (2001) where it is proven in the Private Value auction model that the degree of ill-posedness is equal to one).
Let us now introduce some smoothness hypotheses.
and
is endowed with a suitable topology defined by a norm . Ξ .
For example if Ξ is bounded this norm may be an L p norm or a Sobolev norm, with respect to the uniform distribution.
Assumption 5 The p × p matrix
This hypothesis may not be satisfied for some elements of Ξ i in particular cases. A weaker version of assumption 5 is obtained by introducing an appropriate measure π on Ξ, where the marginal on Ξ i is µ i and by assuming regularity on the support of µ i only (see Example 1 below).
Finally we may consider the function ϕ i as an operator which associates to any γ a function ϕ i (., γ). We denote by Φ i this nonlinear operator defined on Γ and taking values in C q (Ξ). We also consider F θ as an operator, defined on Θ and with values C q (Ξ), which associates the function F θ (.) to θ.
Moreover F θ is also assumed to be Fréchet differentiable and its derivative is denoted
In practice Fréchet differentials can be computed as Gâteaux differentials.
We say that, ∀i = 1, ..., I,
Moreover F θ considered as an operator between Θ 0 and C q (Ξ) may also have Gâteaux
Relations between Gâteaux and Fréchet derivatives are standard topics in functional analysis (see Serfling (1980) , Rieder (1994) or Nashed (1971) for example). We summarize these results by the following remarks:
• A Gâteaux derivative only uses a topology on C q (Ξ) and a Fréchet derivative uses the norms on Γ 0 and C q (Ξ) spaces.
• A Fréchet derivative is a linear continuous (bounded) operator but a Gâteaux derivative may be nonlinear or noncontinuous.
• If a Fréchet derivative exists, it is unique and equal to the Gâteaux derivative.
• The main interesting result is the following: if a Gâteaux derivative exists in a neighborhood of γ 0 , is a linear continuous operator (as a function of γ) and is continuous in γ 0 (as an operator from Γ to the set of continuous linear function from Γ 0 to C q (Ξ)), then this Gâteaux derivative is also a Fréchet derivative. There exist other sets of conditions which guarantee that a Gâteaux derivative is also a Fréchet derivative (see Nashed (1971) ).
• Fréchet differentiability is required in order to apply the implicit function theorem in functional spaces (see Rieder (1994) , theorem 1.4.7).
3 Local Identification Principle
A General Result
The parameters of interest are (θ, λ) = γ ∈ Θ × Λ=Γ⊂Γ 0 , while the observations
θ,λ which is identified.
observationally equivalent to γ iff
The true parameter γ 0 ∈ Γ ⊂ Γ 0 is locally identified iff there exists a neigh-
Theorem 4 Under Assumptions 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6, the game model (1) is locally identified if the bounded linear operator
is one to one.
Proof. Let us consider the operator
Then, local identification is obtained through the implicit function theorem for general spaces (see Rieder (1994) ). If the Fréchet derivative
a one to one operator, the solution γ 0 is unique in a neighborhood of γ 0 and the model is locally identified.
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We now compute this derivative. First remark that
is an element of C q (Ξ) where q ≥ 1 because F θ 0 , and ϕ γ 0 (and then ϕ
. Then using the chain rule for differentiation (valid for Fréchet derivative) we get:
In our notation, we consider G as a function of its arguments (u 1 , ..., u I ) where each u i ∈ R p .
Moreover from F θ 0 − G 0 • ϕ γ 0 = 0 we get, by derivation w.r.t. ξ i :
and the result follows using assumption 5 and the following property:
We can mention three interesting features of this theorem.
First, it does not necessitate the use of the reduced form model, so we do not need to compute G.
Second, we can see that in the parametric case the condition for identification we find here, is just the usual necessary condition used to apply the Generalized Method of Moments (hereafter GMM). In GMM we have the moment equation
, which corresponds to the one to one property. In our way of modeling, the moment equation is A ((θ 0 , λ 0 ) ; G 0 ) = 0 and in the parametric case the GMM rank condition corresponds exactly to our one to one condition on T γ 0 . In other words, our identification condition can be thought of as a functional version of GMM type condition. The last term, involving the derivatives w.r.t. λ comes from the introduction of unknown elements in the strategic function.
Additionally, in our general identification theorem, we do not need ϕ i explicitly, but its (Fréchet) derivatives w.r.t. the private signal ξ and the vector of parameters of interest (θ, λ) (which can be nonparametric). In section 7 we will explain how we can find d θ,λ ϕ i,θ,λ and how to treat the more complicated case of
, when we consider non-closed form solutions for the strategic function ϕ.
The result of Theorem 4 depends on the choice of the norm on the parameter space.
To clarify this point let us consider another norm * on Γ such that γ * ≥ γ . This property implies that if assumption 6 is verified for , it is also verified for * . However, local identification may be satisfied for and not for * . In terms of Theorem 4, if the operator T depends on * , its one to one property may not be verified even if it was the case with . A question could arise concerning the choice of . If we think about estimation, the local identification condition is also a condition for consistency. In consequence, we can choose the norm on Γ used to obtain consistency.
As already discussed in Section 2, equation (3) defines an inverse problem: G may be replaced by an estimator G (e.g. the empirical counterpart) and γ may be estimated by 
Symmetric Independent Private Value Case
For the ease of presentation, in sections 4, 5 and 6 we present our results in the symmetric independent private value case.
In the symmetric independent private value case the ξ i are i.i.d. and the ϕ i are identical.
This implies obviously that the x i are i.i.d. and
. In order to study identification in that case, we may substitute G, F θ and ϕ by their expressions in the previous result.
However it is easier to notice that in the symmetric case observations are i.i.d. across players and games. So, it is sufficient to consider a single observation for one player and one game.
In that case, the parameters γ = (θ, λ) are solution of the equation
The previous results may be reproduced in this framework. Using the same proof as to Theorem 4 we get the following theorem.
Theorem 5 Under Assumptions 1 to 6, the symmetric game model (4) is locally identified if the bounded linear operator:
Note that if ξ i ∈ R, i.e. p = 1, then
is the densityf θ 0 ofF θ 0 .
Example: First Price Private Value Auction Model
In order to understand the use of our identification theorem, we will provide an illustration based on a well-known model. We consider a model of independent private values auction, with symmetric players and i.i.d. private information, which is the same for Dutch and First-Price sealed-bid auctions. This same example will be presented below in the cases of risk neutrality and risk aversion.
Risk Neutrality
To introduce this example, we discuss first the case of risk neutrality. It has been extensively studied and global identification was established by Laffont and Vuong (1996) . Local identification is considered by Florens et al. (2001) and we recall here that argument as a particular case of our general results.
The game is symmetric and for simplification we assume that ξ i ∈Ξ = [0, 1] and ξ i ∼F .
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We treat the model nonparametrically in the sense that θ =F .
Remark: for the ease of notation in this part, we will write ξ instead of ξ i . Since we assume symmetry among players, this has no consequences.
In the Florens et al. (2001) model, the bidding functionφ, derived from Nash equilibrium conditions, is perfectly known and equal tō
if (m + 1) players participate in the auction. Following Florens et al. (2001) we compute the following Gâteaux derivatives:
where H is an element of C q (Ξ) (replacing in this context the elementγ), and
This function is not defined when ξ = 0. We then assume that the set Γ 0 is made of L 
which is finite, because it is the integral of a continuous function on a compact set.
Moreover the application which associates toF the operator TF is also continuous. Let F n denote a sequence which converges toF 0 . Then the Hilbert Schmidt norm of TF n − TF 0 (which is greater than the uniform norm) converges to zero. Using the Nashed (1971) result, it follows that T F is the Fréchet derivative of
The operator TF 0 is one to one because it is invertible:
This shows thatF 0 restricted to [ε, 1] is locally identified for any ε.
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Then TF 0 has no null singular values. It may be proved that the spectrum of TF 0 declines geometrically (i.e. singular values are proportional to 1 j , j = 1, 2, ..., see Florens (2007)), which characterises a mildly ill-posed inverse problem.
Risk Aversion
The case with risk aversion allow us to show more in details how we can use our identification theorem. Following Donald and Paarsch (1996) , we have the following strategic
where m+1 is the number of bidders and λ ⊂ [1, +∞[ ⊂ R. Now, (F, λ) ∈ C q (Ξ)×R and we actually face a semiparametric identification problem. We can now apply our identification Theorem. After some computations (see Appendix) we find that the operator of interest is
where H (respectively β) is the direction inF (respectively λ).
In order to determine if the model is identified in the semiparametric case, we can study TF ,λ (H, β) (ξ) = 0. We can note that
where
Any H and β verifying (5) must also verify ∂ ∂ξ TF ,λ (H, β) (ξ) = 0.
We can rewrite condition (5) and obtain
with
It follows from (6) that ∀β, ∃H (ξ) such that (H, β) ∈ N TF ,λ (H, β) . This implies that dim N TF ,λ (H, β) ≥ dim {β} = 1 and thus that TF ,λ (H, β) is not one to one. Obviously, it is possible to find an identification result if we impose some parametric restriction on the distribution of the private information. For pedagogical purpose, we simplify our model by considering an exponential distribution for the private information and a procurement model, ξ ∼ E (θ). ϕ ξ,F θ , λ = ξ + 1 θmλ .
After computation we find:
and we can also find that N T θ,λ θ ,λ = 0, which implies that the operator T θ,λ is one to one.
We have the following result: in the IPV procurement model with a cost ξ following an exponential distribution, ξ ∼ E (θ) , θ and the parameter of risk aversion λ are locally identified.
Exogeneity

Game Model with Exogenous Variable
As we can see in our example with risk aversion, it is usually difficult to non parametrically identify the distribution of private information and other parameters of the strategy function in the i.i.d. symmetric case, because all the components are mixed in the distribution of the observable. The usual econometric intuition is naturally to consider exogenous variables which shift separately the distribution of private information and the strategy function in order to get identification. In order to formalize this more general framework we first consider the definition of exogeneity in game models and its implications for identification.
For simplicity we only consider a symmetric model with a single observation (one player in one game) and we drop the index i to clarify the notation. Let us decompose ξ ∈ R p into (η, ζ) ∈ R r+s (where r + s = p) and x into (y, z) ∈ R r+s .
Definition 6
We define z as exogenous if:
1. the strategic function takes the form
i.e., part of the private information vector is directly observable 2. there exists a decomposition of θ into (ρ, µ) such that:
• the marginal distribution of ζ only depends on ρ
• the conditional distribution of η given ζ only depends on µ
• ρ and µ are variation free i.e., ρ, µ and z realize a cut in the model of unobservable variables 3.φ only depends on θ through the element µ All the Assumptions 1 to 6 apply. Then:
Theorem 7 Under Assumption 1, ρ, (µ, λ), and z realize a cut in the observable model (i.e., the marginal distribution of z only depends on ρ, the conditional distribution of y given z only depends on (µ, λ), and ρ and (µ, λ) are variation free.
Proof. As θ and λ are variation free and µ and ρ variation free, we immediately conclude that ρ and (µ, λ) are variation free. The marginal distribution of z is identical to the marginal distribution of ζ and depends on ρ only. Let us consider the conditional distribution of y given z.
whereF z µ is the conditional distribution of η given z, and thus only depends on λ and µ.
We may now discuss identification.
• Identification of ρ does not raise specific problems and if µ and λ are our only parameters of interest, this question is not relevant.
• If we denote by G z the conditional distribution function of y given z, the conditional game model is now fully characterized by the following (functional) nonlinear equation:
which is identical to (4) except that conditional distributions replace marginal ones.
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The same argument given in Theorem 1 applies here. Intuitively if the operator
is one to one, then µ and λ are locally identified. More precisely all assumptions 1 to 6 should be extended to this conditional model. These extensions can easily be seen by "fixing" the z at a particular value on the support of this variable.
10 The notationF z µ can also be understood as the conditional distributionF Y |Z (.|.) so that one may have e.g. µ =F Y |Z (.|.) in the nonparametric case.
Exogeneity and Exclusion
Let us decompose z into z 1 and z 2 (or equivalently as z = ζ, ζ 1 , and ζ 2 ) and let us assume the following:
Assumption 7 z is an exogenous vector of variables, and the sampling model of unobservable verifies the following conditional independence :
where z 1 and z 2 are variation free.
In a game model exogenous variables may have many interpretations:
• some of the variables influence the distribution of types and are different throughout the games but are identical to all players (for example in an auction model the private values of the good may be dependent on some characteristics of the good).
• some of the variables characterize the players and are typically identified through different games. These variables are particularly interesting because they may be a way to construct an asymmetric game (by conditioning) from a symmetric game (in the joint model).
• finally some variables may describe the rules of the game. They are present in the ϕ function but not in the distribution of the unobservables.
In our presentation z 1 represents the last two categories of variables.
Our main result formalizes an identification strategy which is easy to implement in practice: first, check if the model is identified given λ (if the strategy is perfectly known as a function of η, z and µ); second, check a supplementary condition which guarantees the identification.
Theorem 8 We assume assumptions 1 to 7 and η and y ∈ R. If i) µ is identified in a model where λ is known (and equals to its true value) ii)
This result separates the identification procedure into two relatively simple verifications.
Moreover the second condition only depends on ϕ (and not onF
) and must be verified independently of any hypotheses on the distribution of unobservable variables.
Example (cont'd)
We consider again the First Price Private Value auction example with risk aversion. In the following, we simply discuss the use of exogenous variables characterized by the following assumptions (relative to one observation i.e. one player in one game).
ξ z ,
This model could have different interpretations. For example λ (z) = λz where z + 1 is the number of participants (which varies in that model) or λ (z) = mλ (z) whereλ (z) is the coefficient of risk aversion dependent on the characteristics and m + 1 is the number of participants (fixed).
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We consider as parameters of the conditional model the two functions F and λ (with true values F 0 and λ 0 ). We assume F z , F , and λ are variation free in order to treat z as an exogenous variable (actually z plays the role of z 1 and there is no z 2 in our example). The linear operator associated with this game is
In order to show local identification, we have to show that N T F,λ F ,λ = 0, i.e. show that T F,λ F ,λ = 0 impliesF andλ = 0, whereF is a function of ξ andλ a function of z.
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It is sufficient to consider the case where the sum between the brackets equals to 0. After some manipulation and a derivation w.r.t. ξ this equality implies
This then impliesλ (z) = 0 andF (ξ) = 0 except if ∂ 2 ln a ∂z∂ξ = 0.
13
For simplicity we consider a single z. If many z appear, we can take the derivative w.r.t.
any element of z.
To conclude the analysis we compute
The sum between brackets is generically non zero (e.g. take ξ = 1 and assume f 0 = 0, 12 As in the case without exogenous variables, problems regarding integration around 0 also arise here. For simplicity this question is neglected here but may be treated as in Section 3.
13 Indeed, ifλ (z) = 0, a is the product of a function of z and a function of ξ and satisfies
then this sum should be strictly positive). We have then the following result.
Theorem 9 In the model (9) the condition ∂λ 0 (z) ∂z = 0 is sufficient to establish local identification of λ and F .
If many z are present, the above condition for any one component of z is sufficient.
This Theorem may be illustrated in the following way.
Let z = (z 1 , z 2 ), ξ|z ∼ ξ|z 2 ∼ F (.|z 2 ) (i.e. ξ z 1 |z 2 : conditional independence) and
where the parameters are the functions F (ξ|z 2 ) and λ (z 1 , z 2 ). Then all the previous computations may be extended and the sufficient condition for identification becomes
This result proves that the introduction of exogenous variables in the distribution of ξ is not sufficient to reach identification and that specific exogenous variables should influence the λ parameter.
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Randomised Strategies
In our previous analysis we have always assumed that the relationship between the type or the signal ξ and the action x, played by the participants of the game, was deterministic.
A natural extension of this framework is to consider the case when the strategic function is 14 Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong (2009) consider a similar case for global identification. There are some clear differences, though. In particular, we do not specify endogenous participation. Also, we can directly apply our general approach, and after short derivations we can show the main result: in order to obtain identification, specific exogenous variables should influence the risk aversion parameter.
replaced by a conditional probability distribution of x given ξ (and dependent on the distribution generating ξ and probably other parameters). Here also we simplify the presentation by only considering symmetric games where a single observation (one player in one game) is used and here also we drop the index i. The original model is now replaced by
where H (u|ξ, θ, λ) = P (x ≤ u|ξ, θ, λ) is a conditional distribution on ξ depending on θ and λ.
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Exogenous variables may be also introduced in the framework of section 3. We do not explicitly consider this case, even if it is particularly relevant for applications.
The model is now constructed in a standard probabilistic way: given the marginalF θ on ξ and the conditional distribution H, we may construct a joint distribution on (ξ, x) from which the marginalḠ
is the analog of equation (3) in the deterministic case.
Equation (10) defines another inversion problem which will be considered locally in order to construct a condition for local uniqueness of the solution.
Remark 10 Note that properties such as monotonicity ofφ are no longer required. The inversion ofφ is replaced by the Bayes theorem which may be used to construct the conditional distribution of ξ given x (and θ and λ).
We may extend our previous theorems to the case considered here, but the study of the null space of the linear operator may be a difficult task.
To illustrate this point, let us take a model where θ =F . Indeed, in the deconvolution problem x = ξ + ε there is no way to identifyF and some components of ε. The distribution of ε should be completely known in order to identifyF . However a game theoretic model x = η + ε, where η =φ ξ,F , λ , may introduce some constraints in the distribution of η which may be used to identify some aspects of the distribution of ε. For example, let us consider the case where η =φ ξ,F , λ =F (ξ). In this case η is uniformly distributed for anyF and the distribution of ε is fully identified by the model x =F (ξ) + ε, even ifF is non identified. The general identification question of the additive model whereφ is more general, is a non trivial problem.
In the parametric case we may develop a rank argument based on a linear approximation of Equation (10). Indeed, the parameters are locally identified if the family of functions
In general, the first order conditions of local identification, expressed without technicalities, may be written as
and solving this linear equation may be a difficult task.
tions
In numerous complex games the vector of strategiesφ = (ϕ 1 , ..., ϕ I ) is not explicit but is the solution of a functional set of equations summarized by:
Let us take for example the case of Nash equilibrium. For a player i the value of playing
, is in general:
Each player maximizes expected utility given ξ i :
and the set of first order conditions creates the set of conditions:
We may summarize this set of equations by (11).
The next step would be to solve this problem and to get the set of ϕ iγ (ξ i ) from which d γ Φ iγ 0 and ∂ϕ iγ 0 may be described and used in the local identification condition.
We may however remark that those elements may be, in some cases, directly obtained without computation ofφ, but just using the implicit function A (φ, γ) = 0.
For instance, the implicit function theorem may be used to compute d γ Φ iγ 0 . Indeed
This result has a particular interest if A is a nonlinear operator, because equation (12) implies the resolution of a linear functional equation, namely:
where x and y are in suitable spaces.
However, we also need to compute
, which cannot be derived from (11) Iγ . Indeed
Here also this computation actually needs the inversion of a linear operator. Finally, by derivation of the identities ϕ iγ ϕ −1
iγ (x) = x we find
The right hand side of this equation is precisely the element depending onφ γ we need for the computation of the operator T and it may be obtained by solving (13) and by a composition with ϕ iγ 0 .
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Note that the methodology we develop in this section should be adapted to specific case and some computation may be simplified using the specific features of these particular cases.
Interestingly, Armantier and Sbaï (2006) 
Conclusion
This paper has established a new general and flexible procedure to study local identification for a broad class of games. Parameters of interest are not necessarily only those that characterize the distribution of players' private value, but may also be dissociated structural parameters, such as a parameter of risk aversion. We also allow for asymmetric players with affiliated information by using a general form of the implicit function theorem to present a local identification principle.
A clear advantage of our local identification approach is that it is much more general than the identification results already existing for some specific models. The approach is flexible in that it is applicable to games with partially or fully observable exogenous variables, randomized (mixed) strategies, and no closed formed solution for the first order conditions.
In the last case, an application has been already successfully implemented in Armantier and Sbaï (2006) . A clear benefit from considering specific models is the ability to establish identifiability assumptions or restrictions, in a way similar to Athey and Haile (2002) .
This is a possible extension to our work, as well as the possibility to establish a class of distributions for which we can obtain identification in games that were a priori unidentified. Sbaï (2007) follows this direction and provides more illustrations using our identification approach. Incentive regulation models, as studied in Perrigne and Vuong (2004) , may receive more specific attention.
To conclude, we contribute to the growing literature on the structural econometric analysis of game theoretic models (overviewed in Paarsch and Hong (2006) ). A general approach to identification is provided that opens up the econometric study of a broad class of models, and more particularly expanding the limits of structural analysis in empirical games of incomplete information.
First Price Private Value Auction Model with Risk Aversion
We present here in detail the necessary calculus to obtain the different elements of our operator of interest TF ,λ .
Computation of dF ΦF ,λ (H)
We recall that dF ΦF ,λ (H) = lim
We expand the right-hand side term: We can compute ∂ϕF ,λ (ξ) = ∂ ∂ξ ϕF ,λ (ξ) = 1 + mλF (ξ) 
